Sommaire: Under Canadian constitutional law, state neutrality acts as an implicit organizing principle for the relations between the state and religions. Neutrality, however, is a polysemic word: conceptions of neutrality vary. Competing versions of neutrality feature in the decisions of Canadian courts. This is starkly evident in decisions that originate from Quebec, where judges have harboured divergent views of neutrality on matters such as the reciting of prayers in town hall meetings or the teaching of religious diversity in schools. This article analyses how the Canadian Supreme Court has manoeuvred through competing conceptions of state religious neutrality. Initially divided, the Court seems to have eventually opted for a type of neutrality that allows the state to recognize the existence of religions in laws and policies, but that also prevents it from indoctrination and from arbitrating between competing viewpoints within religions. This view of neutrality, I argue, is consistent with the principle of multiculturalism and with the Court’s characterization of a ‘free and democratic society’, as this notion is understood in Canada.
Département des sciences juridiques