Publications

This book focuses on how public and private international law address civil liability for transboundary pollution. In public international law, civil liability treaties promote the implementation of minimum procedural standards in domestic tort law. This approach implicitly relies on private international law to facilitate civil litigation against transboundary polluters. Yet this connection remains poorly understood. Filling the gap, this book engages in a meaningful dialogue between the two areas and explores how domestic private international law can reflect the policies developed in international environmental law. It begins with an investigation of civil liability in international environmental law. It then identifies preferable rules of civil jurisdiction, foreign judgments and choice of law for environmental damage, using Canadian private international law as a case study and making extensive references to European law. Liability for transboundary pollution is a contentious issue of the law, both in scholarship and practice: international lawyers both private and public as well as environmental lawyers will welcome this important work.

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Extraits :

« […] le terme IA est plus communément utilisé pour désigner l’ensemble des techniques qui permettent d’élaborer des systèmes pouvant effectuer des tâches définies qui sont généralement attribuées aux humains. »

 « […] parallèlement à l’enthousiasme engendré par les opportunités de progrès et d’expansion qu’offre l’IA, de nombreuses études ont montré l’existence de risques importants de discrimination inhérents au développement et à l’application des systèmes d’IA. »

« Il est important de considérer qu’au regard de la diversité et de la complexité des enjeux de discrimination liés à l’IA, il n’est pas possible de considérer une réponse unique. L’élaboration de plusieurs cadres normatifs complémentaires est nécessaire.»

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Autrice

Alexandra Parada est candidate au doctorat en droit à l’UQAM, sous la direction du professeur Hugo Cyr, membre du CRIDAQ. Elle est également récipiendaire d’une Bourse d’excellence Banque Scotia-IEIM 2021.

Sommaire: Under Canadian constitutional law, state neutrality acts as an implicit organizing principle for the relations between the state and religions. Neutrality, however, is a polysemic word: conceptions of neutrality vary. Competing versions of neutrality feature in the decisions of Canadian courts. This is starkly evident in decisions that originate from Quebec, where judges have harboured divergent views of neutrality on matters such as the reciting of prayers in town hall meetings or the teaching of religious diversity in schools. This article analyses how the Canadian Supreme Court has manoeuvred through competing conceptions of state religious neutrality. Initially divided, the Court seems to have eventually opted for a type of neutrality that allows the state to recognize the existence of religions in laws and policies, but that also prevents it from indoctrination and from arbitrating between competing viewpoints within religions. This view of neutrality, I argue, is consistent with the principle of multiculturalism and with the Court’s characterization of a ‘free and democratic society’, as this notion is understood in Canada.

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Dia Dabby, “‘World-repairing’ and ‘non-religious’ in law: antithetical notions or new mindsets?” dans Lori G. Beaman & Timothy Stacey (dir.), Nonreligious Imaginaries of World Repairing (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 117-125 (https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030728809).

Sommaire: This chapter seeks to engage with law’s understanding of non-religious commitments. When brought before the courts, these engagements are expressed and justified through the language of ‘culture’, ‘spirituality’ or ‘philosophy’. Drawing on three recent cases from Canadian, American and British jurisdictions, this chapter contends that the non-religious commitments conveyed offer distinctive elements to understanding what non-religion and ‘world-repairing’ (the latter as coined by Linda Woodhead) look like in law’s realm. This chapter suggests that particular citizenship-building capacities are developed through these case studies and also invite closer scrutiny on how we understand and articulate considerations related to time and visibility in the context of non-religious claims. Ultimately, this chapter invites the reader to consider non-religious commitments in law as ‘otherworldly’ engagements, in order to offer a more textured understanding of how different people can get along.

Ce document a été rédigé par Touwendé Roland Ouédraogo, candidat au doctorat et chargé de cours au département des sciences juridiques de l’UQAM, 7 juin 2021

À l’occasion de la Journée mondiale de l’environnement, célébrée le 5 juin, dont le thème en 2021 est « Réimaginer. Recréer. Restaurer », l’IEIM est heureux de vous proposer un texte sur l’environnement et les droits humains, depuis différentes perspectives – québécoise, canadienne et internationale.

«Plusieurs États de par le monde reconnaissent des liens étroits entre environnement et droits humains en consacrant dans leur législation ou constitution un droit humain à un environnement sain. En la matière, le Québec a une légère avance sur le Canada qui est à la traine par rapport à plusieurs autres États.»

«Le récent Projet de loi C-28, Loi sur le renforcement de la protection de l’environnement pour un Canada en santé, ouvre de nouvelles perspectives pour le Canada en matière de droit à un environnement sain.»

Découvrez le texte complet, publié dans le cadre de la série Regards de l’IEIM.

Dia Dabby & Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “Constitutionalism and Religion in common law North America” dans Susanna Mancini (dir.), Constitutions and Religion (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020), 111-138.

Résumé: “This chapter examines constitutionalism and religion in common law North America, namely, Canada and the United States. While both countries share the broad contours of constitutional protection of religion, each country’s historical trajectory has shaped it irrevocably in its own mold. This chapter suggests that transversal frameworks do permeate both Canada and the United States, such as Indigenous spiritualities and reasonable accommodation: they indicate both tensions on the form and function of the legal protections of religion and a deep imbalance between the migration of constitutional concepts. This chapter analyzes particular sites of divergence or convergence between these two countries to illuminate the interplay of constitutionalism and religion through religious prayers in public institutions, marriage and end-of-life decisions.”

Dia Dabby, “Mapping Multiculturalism By/Before the Courts” (2020) 99 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 307-332.

Résumé: “Multiculturalism, in both its policy and constitutional forms, constitutes an undeniable component of Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s constitutional legacy. It has been employed as Canada’s leitmotif since its introduction as official policy and guiding Charter provision. Yet its form, function and ultimately coherence, with freedom of religion claims under section 2a) of the Charter, is worthy of further investigation as part of Trudeau’s constitutional footprint. This article therefore asks, in the context of court decisions on religion, what does multiculturalism tell us about who we are and our constitutional identities? This article investigates multiculturalism’s hermeneutical value and its continued constitutional relevance. It first examines how multiculturalism has been marshalled in public opinion and the Canadian caselaw as well as through academic commentary. It then analyzes and tracks how – and whether – the courts’ understandings of multiculturalism cohere with public policy during select moments in Canada’s constitutional history. It concludes by reflecting on multiculturalism’s promise, but also, the inherent challenge in recounting, assessing and appraising the contribution of a constitutionalized aspiration.”

« Mort à la mort! », Gaële Gidrol-Mistral et Anne-Sophie Hulin, in Mourir au 21 e siècle : entre corporalités et technologies, Audrey Deveault, Michaël Lessard (dir.), Y. Blais 2021, p. 23 à 52.

https://store.thomsonreuters.ca/en-ca/pdp/mourir-au-21e-sicle/42812176

RÉSUMÉ

Les évolutions technologiques et scientifiques ont progressivement déplacé les frontières qui séparent le monde des morts, qui relève a priori du domaine des choses, du monde des vivants, qui relève de celui des personnes. Techniques de conservation et de transplantation des produits du corps (organes, gamètes, embryons), augmentation des capacités (implants, puces, transhumanisme et cryogénisation) et autonomie de la vie numérique dessinent les contours d’une vie après la mort. Le droit civil, dont les catégories choses/personnes semblent ne plus totalement répondre à ces nouvelles formes de survivance de la personne, doit désormais se questionner sur le statut de ces « morts-vivants ».